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Abstract 
While skilled immigration ceteris paribus provides an immediate boost to GDP per capita by adding to the 
human capital stock of the receiving economy, might it also reduce the number of ’good jobs’, i.e. those with 
training, available to indigenous workers? This paper analyzes this issue theoretically and empirically. The 
theoretical model shows how skilled immigration may affect the sectoral allocation of labor and how it may 
have a positive or negative effect on the training and social mobility of native born workers. The empirical 
analysis uses UK data from 2001 to 2018 to show that training rates of UK born workers have declined in a 
period where immigration has been rising strongly, and have declined significantly more in high wage non-
traded sectors. At the sectoral level however this link is much less strong but there is evidence of different 
effects of skilled immigration across traded and non-traded sectors and evidence that the hiring of UK born 
workers in high wage non-traded sectors has been negatively affected by skilled immigration, although this 
effect is not large. Taken together the theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that skilled immigration may 
have some role in allocating native born workers away from ’good jobs’ sectors but it is unlikely to be a major 
driver of social mobility. 
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1 Introduction
Recent studies on the effects of immigration have argued that skilled immigrants add to
the human capital stock of an economy and thereby improve its productivity.1 Moreover
the empirical evidence for the UK suggests that rising immigration has had few detri-
mental effects on the average employment prospects of UK-born workers, whether less
skilled or otherwise.2 Yet these findings do not exclude the possibility that migrants
with human capital may crowd out the human capital formation of indigenous workers if
firms hire ready trained workers rather than undergo the expense of hiring and training
a local workforce.
UK data suggests that training rates of native born workers have been declining
significantly over a period when skilled immigration has been rising strongly. This paper
describes a theoretical model where skilled immigration may have a positive or negative
effect on training and hiring depending on the characteristics of the sector and of the
migrant. The paper then investigates the effects of skilled immigration empirically using
sector level data from the UK from 2001-2018.
There is long established literature on the economics of training following Becker’s
(1964) insight that firms will only provide general training if they are able to capture part
of the resultant increase in worker’s productivity.3 The literature however has largely
neglected the role of on-the-job training on social mobility, i.e. the opportunity for indi-
viduals from low wealth backgrounds to enter high wage employment. In this paper we
focus on this issue and in turn analyse the effects of skilled immigration on training and
hiring, and the implications for social mobility. We imbed a model of employment based
training into a model of income distribution dynamics where informational asymmetries
imply that low wealth individuals cannot borrow to finance their own training. However
if firms have an informational advantage over financial markets in monitoring their em-
ployees and are also able to capture a part of the increase in their workers’ productivity
due to training, then the provision of on-the-job training may allow low wealth individ-
uals to accumulate skills. In this way on-the-job training may have a beneficial effect on
social mobility.
1See e.g. Mountford and Rapoport (2011) and Wadsworth (2010).
2See e.g. Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012).
3See Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999b). This can occur due to asymmetric information between
employers and employees, imperfect competition in the labour market, or contractual obligations of
training programs. See Dustmann and Schoenberg (2012).
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We then examine the effects that immigration may have on this process. The liter-
ature on skilled migration has emphasized the potential of skilled immigration to add to
the economy’s human capital stock.4 However skilled immigration also has the potential
to limit and erode the provision of on-the-job training. We demonstrate this possibility
in a model where training opportunities differ across sectors. We derive the model for
the case where the two sectors are traded and non traded, and where training opportuni-
ties are available only in the non-traded goods sector. We abstract from training in the
traded sector as traded production is tied with location decisions. Without immigration
a traded good producer may choose to relocate away from the home economy.5 In con-
trast the non-traded sector must produce in the home economy and its scale is limited
by the size of the domestic economy. Consequently, skilled immigration may potentially
cause indigenous labor to be allocated away from this sector and any associated training
opportunities.
There are also potentially positive effects of skilled immigration on training. In-
creased profitability caused by skilled immigration may induce firm entry into sectors
which train workers. Skilled migrants may also directly train domestic workers. Wealthy
migrants will increase the demand for non-traded goods and so will increase the need for
trained workers in this sector. All these effects are present in the model. Furthermore it
should also be stressed that positive and negative effects may be operating on the econ-
omy both at the same time and differently across and within sectors. Thus ultimately
the effect of skilled immigration on the training of native workers is an empirical matter
and this motivates the second part of the paper.
Using UK data across industries and occupations from the Labour Force Survey
(LFS), we find a large variation in both the level of and trends in the training and hiring
of UK born workers across sectors, alongside differential use of skilled immigrant labour.
Immigration appears to have a differential effect on training rates across the traded and
non-traded sectors, being positive in the former and negative in the latter. There is also
evidence of a negative association between hiring rates and skilled immigration in the
high wage non-traded sector. These effects are not large but suggest that immigration
may have some role in allocating native workers to sectors with lower levels of training.
If so then social mobility in the receiving economy, as well as the welfare of this group,
4See e.g. Mountford and Rapoport (2011) and Wadsworth (2010), Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth
(2012).
5The logic of the paper only requires that training opportunities differ within sectors and would apply
if these also existed in the traded sector.
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Table 1: Broad Sector Trends in Training, Hiring and Immigration 2001-2018
Sector On-The-Job Skilled Adult Sector Share
Training Share of UK Immigrant Share of all UK-Born
Born Employees in Sector in Sector Hires
(%) Point Change (%) Point Change (%) Point Change
Total -6.1 +5.1 0
Traded -5.4 +5.5 -0.15
Non-Traded Low Wage -4.3 +5.2 -0.06
Non-Traded High Wage -8.7 +4.9 0.17
Notes: Source LFS and authors’ calculations.
could be being reduced by skilled immigration.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we motivate the analysis and
outline some of the broad stylised facts about recent immigration, hiring and training
trends in the UK economy. Section 3 describes the dynamic general equilibrium model of
training. Section 4 analyzes theoretically the effect of immigration on training and social
mobility in this model. Section 5 describes the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Recent Trends in Training and Immigration
At an aggregate level one may be tempted to conclude that there is an obvious
negative association between immigration and the training of UK-born workers. Figure
1a) shows a large downward trend in the share of UK-born employees who say they
have received some training (at work or at college) while employed over the previous 3
months. Aggregate on the job training rates of UK-born workers fell from 26.5% in 2001
to 20.4 % in 2018, see Table 1. This has coincided with a clear rise in both the total
immigrant and skilled immigrant shares of the workforce. The hiring rate of UK-born
workers, in contrast, is much more cyclical. Figure 1b) shows a negative association
between immigration and hiring prior to the downturn and a positive one in a recovery
of employment. However, it is important to investigate whether these associations hold
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Figure 1: Aggregate Training, Hiring of UK Born Workers and Immigration
at a sectoral level.
Table 1 outlines the change in the rate of on-the-job training and hiring in the
UK over time by three broad sectors; high-wage non-traded sector, low wage non-traded
sector and the traded sector.6 There is a clear downward trend in all three sectors in the
share of UK-born employees who say they have received some training in the previous 3
months. While native training levels remain highest in the high wage non-traded sector,
the trend decline is notably steepest in this sector. Training in this sector fell from about
33% to 24% between 2001 and 2017, compared to the traded sector which fell from about
22% to 16%. Table 1 shows that the average sectoral share of hiring, is much more stable,
although there is a clear upward trend in the share of the high wage non-traded sector
in hiring, mostly at the expense of the traded sector.
A more disaggregated analysis shows great variation across sectors. Table 2 dis-
plays for three digit level sectors the sample mean training and immigration rates for
the highest and lowest training and hiring rate sectors at the beginning and end of the
sample. In 2001, the sectors with the highest on-the-job training rates were associate pro-
fessionals in Health and Social Care, predominantly nurses, and the occupations with the
lowest on-the-job training share were Carers and Elementary Domestic Workers, such as
cleaners. There is no clear association with immigrant share as two of the best and worst
sectors had greater than average shares of skilled migrants. In 2017, the best and worse
6We define a high wage as a sector paying above the mean sectoral hourly wage. The traded sector is
defined as SIC classifications 1-4 which corresponds to agriculture, energy and manufacturing.
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Table 2: Training, Hiring and Immigration by Sector and Year
Year Sector On-the-Job Skilled Sector Average Sector Skilled
Training Adult Share of all Adult
Share UK-born Immigrant UK born Immigrant
Employees in Share Hires Share
Sector (%) (%) (%) (%)
2001
Total 26.5 2.3 0.64 2.3
Top 3 Ass.Prof(Health)(322) 52.1 2.3 Sales(Retail)(708) 10.0 0.9
Prof. Social Care(324) 49.0 4.4 Element.(Food)(910) 6.2 2.7
Ass.Prof(Pub.Adm)(320) 48.5 1.8 Skill(Constrn.)(507) 3.20 0.5
Bottom 3 Caring(Dom.)(629) 3.8 6.6 Managers(Arts)(125) 0.01 3.3
Managers(Dom.)(129) 4.3 7.3 Managers(Sci)(117) 0.02 5.1
Element(Dom.)(929) 5.7 1.3 Prof.(Food)(203) 0.03 2.4
2017
Total 20.0 7.2 0.64 7.2
Top 3 Ass.Prof(Health)(322) 40.3 10.8 Element.(Food)(910) 8.1 9.7
Prof. (Health) (222) 38.4 16.8 Sales(Retail)(708) 7.8 5.1
Ass.Prof(Pub.Adm)(320) 36.9 2.7 Prof.(Educ.)(221) 4.4 7.5
Bottom 3 Element(Support)(918) 5.8 11.7 Managers(Dom)(129) 0.01 0.1
Process.(Manuf)(804) 4.8 5.6 Managers(Arts)(125) 0.02 4.4
Element(Dom.)(929) 2.4 15.6 Prof. (Food)(203) 0.03 14.3
Source LFS
5
sectors for training are similar (Designers replace Cleaners in the lowest three training
rate sectors). As before, two of the top three high training occupations had higher than
average immigration shares and two of the bottom three had higher than average immi-
gration shares. Similar patterns emerge in the second part of Table 2 concerning hiring.
While there is considerable variation in the share of native hiring attributable to each
sector it is hard to see a clear correlation with skilled immigrant share.
3 A Model of Training and Social Mobility
This section describes a theoretical model which illustrates the effects of training op-
portunities on human capital accumulation, social mobility and the income distribution.
We then analyze the potential effects of skilled immigration on these processes. The
model builds on the framework of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Maoz and Moav (2004)
assuming an informational asymmetry between borrowers looking to invest in training
and lenders. Lenders cannot observe the effort that the borrower puts into making their
training a success. In addition, we assume that lenders are not able to force borrowers
below a minimum level of consumption. These two imperfections in the loan market
can prevent low wealth individuals from being able to borrow to fund their training in
equilibrium. Employers in some sectors, however, have an advantage over the finan-
cial market in that they have a close interaction with their employees and so are able,
for a small cost, to monitor their investment in training.7 We assume that benefits of
training are shared between the worker and the firm via a bargaining process.8 In this
way on-the-job training allows individuals, who otherwise wouldn’t have been able to,
to accumulate skills and is thus a source of upward social mobility. As we shall see, the
possibility to hire already trained workers from overseas alters the equilibrium and so
may potentially impede social mobility.
3.1 Production
We assume that there is a traded good and a non-traded good. We focus our analysis
on the non-traded sector and abstract from training in the traded sector. The traded
sector is assumed to have a perfectly competitive market structure as in, for example
7This assumption follows the financial literature on monitoring of e.g. Diamond (1984, 1991).
8See Dustmann and Schoenberg (2009) for empirical evidence for the positive effects of intertemporal
agreements or understanding between unions and employers on training.
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Galor and Zeira (1992), and output of the traded good at time period s, Y ts , is given by
the following production function,
Y ts = F
U(LUt,s) + F
H(LHt,s, Kt,s)
where LUt,s is the number of unskilled workers, L
H
t,s is the number of educated or skilled
workers and Kt,s is the amount of capital employed in the traded goods sector at time
period s. We assume that both elements of the production function operate under con-
stant returns to scale. Thus for unskilled workers FU(Lut,s) = w
U
s L
U
t,s and F
H(LHt,s, Kt,s)
is a constant returns to scale function with decreasing positive marginal products and
boundary conditions such that LHt,s and Kt,s are always positive in equilibrium. We as-
sume that wages in this sector are determined competitively and equal their marginal
products and that the rate of interest is set exogenously by the world capital market, at
a level R. Capital flows in and out of the economy in an unrestricted way so that the
interest rate in the economy always equals R, and this fixes the skilled wage, wHs . There
is free movement of unskilled workers between sectors.
The non traded good is also produced under perfect competition using a continuum
of specialized inputs, Yj,s, following the production structure in Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Trabandt (2016). At time s, the output of the non-traded good, Y nts , is given by the
following CES production function
Y nts =
[∫
1
0
Y
ρ
j,sdj
] 1
ρ
where 0 < ρ < 1 and where Yj,s is the output of specialist input j at time s. Each
specialized input is produced by a monopolist according to a constant returns to scale
production function so that
Yj,s = Ajx
j
s
where xjs is the amount of the homogeneous intermediate good, x, which is used to
produce the specialist input good Yj at time period s.
The intermediate good, x is produced competitively and sold at the price of pxs
in period s. The intermediate good can be produced using either unskilled labor, or by
trained workers. We describe the implications of these options below. The price of the
intermediate good determines the marginal cost of producing the specialized input p
x
s
Aj
.
As is well known in this set up the monopolist sets the price of the specialized input as
a markup over its marginal cost so that,
pjs =
pxs
Ajρ
∀j
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where ε = 1
1−ρ
is the price elasticity of demand for the specialist inputs.
3.2 Individuals
The population consists of overlapping generations. A generation of size 1 is born in
each period and lives for two periods. Each individual has one parent and one child. In
their first period of life agents receive a bequest from their parent and have a choice of
whether to invest in human capital. In their second period of life agents supply labor
inelastically but choose optimally between consuming and bequeathing to their child.
We assume that agents are subject to a subsistence constraint in the tradeable good i.e.
consumption cannot fall below level c˜.
Preferences of each individual agent i born in period s are defined over their second
period choices for consumption of the traded good cts+1, consumption of the non-traded
good cnts+1 and their bequest bs+1 and are represented by the following utility function
us = (c
t
s+1 − c˜)
α(cnts+1)
βb
1−α−β
s+1
where 0 < α, β < α + β < 1 and where c˜ is the subsistence level of consumption of the
traded good. Each agent has a budget constraint
cts+1 + p
nt
s+1c
nt
s+1 + bs+1 = I
i
t+1
where I is+1 is the income of agent i at time period s + 1. Utility maximization implies
the following optimal shares of expenditure:
cts+1 = c˜+ α(I
i
s+1 − c˜)
pnts+1c
nt
s+1 = β(I
i
s+1 − c˜)
bis+1 = (1− α− β)(I
i
s+1 − c˜)
3.3 Human Capital Investment and Capital Market Imperfec-
tions
We assume, following Galor and Zeira (1993), that being skilled in period s+ 1 requires
an indivisible investment of size e in period s. However the success of this investment
is not guaranteed. The probability of success depends on the actions of individuals,
as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Individuals have a choice between being diligent
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which implies a success probability of πh and being less diligent which implies a success
probability of πl but which also confers a private benefit, B. The action of the individual
and so the probability of success cannot be observed by the financial markets, only the
outcome. Furthermore, we assume that financial markets cannot force people below the
subsistence level of consumption and so banks cannot recover all the costs of training in
the event that it is not successful.
We first derive conditions under which there is no lending by financial markets for
low wealth individuals for human capital accumulation in equilibrium. Then in section
3.5 we assume that employers in the intermediate goods sector have the ability to ensure
their employee’s diligence at a cost of C, via monitoring.9 This allows the employer to
offer on the job training which can enable low wealth agents working in the intermediate
sector to become trained and so earn more than the unskilled wage. We show in section
4 how this on the job training can have a persistent effect on social mobility.
3.3.1 Individual Human Capital Investment Decision
In the absence of informational asymmetries, we assume that being diligent in training is
the best strategy for all agents and so agents with a sufficient level of wealth (bequests)
will choose to be diligent.10 We restrict the parameters in the model so that
πh(wH − wU) > eR
πl(wH − wU) +B < eR
However financial markets are not able to recover all the costs of training in the event
that it is not successful. Specifically we assume that banks cannot force people below the
subsistence level of consumption, c˜. This distorts the investment decision of individuals
with low wealth. Individuals will only have an incentive to be diligent if the rate at
which they borrow, R∗ satisfies the following inequality
R∗ <
1
(e− bi)
[
(wH − c˜)−
B
πh − πl
]
In equilibrium financial intermediaries need to make the expected international rate of
return, R. This can only occur if R∗ satisfies the following inequality
R∗ >
1
(e− bi)
R(e− bi)− (1− πh)(wU − c˜)
πh
9This follow the financial economics literature on monitoring and financial markets see especially Dia-
mond’s (1984,1991) Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Freixas and Rochet (2008).
10The model would not be of interest if this was not the case.
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Those with a higher level of wealth (bequests) have a greater incentive to be diligent
and so can be charged a lower interest rate in equilibrium. These inequalities imply that
there will be no lending in equilibrium to individuals with wealth level, bi, if
1
(e− bi)
R∗(e− bi)− (1− πh)(wu − c˜)
πh
>
1
(e− bi)
[
(wH − c˜)−
B
πh − πl
]
which implies that only agents with wealth higher than b̂ will be able to borrow to invest
where
b̂ = e−
(wu − c˜) + πh(wH − wu)− π
hB
πh−πl
R
The model therefore describes what we regard as a realistic scenario where agents with
low wealth are unable to borrow to invest in human capital accumulation. Agents with
higher wealth, in contrast, will use their wealth to accumulate skills. Thus in the absence
of government intervention there would be no upward income mobility for low wealth
agents.11
3.4 Equilibrium Without On-The-Job Training
When there is no training all the homogeneous intermediate good, x, is produced com-
petitively under constant returns to scale using unskilled labor. The production function
for x at time period s, is the following
xs = a
u
xL
U
x,s
where LUx,s is the amount of unskilled labor employed in the intermediate goods sector
at time s. Thus the price of one unit of the intermediate good is pxs =
wus
aux
.
The monopolist sets the price of each of the specialized inputs, pjs as a markup over its
marginal cost and so
pjs =
pxs
Ajρ
=
wus
auxAjρ
∀j
Symmetry in equilibrium implies that the price of the non-traded good is equal to the
price of the specialized inputs and so equilibrium is achieved by the allocation of un-
skilled workers between the traded and non-traded sectors. Given the agent’s first order
conditions, the market clearing condition is given by
11See the Section 4 below on income distribution dynamics
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βpnts
[∫
iεLu
(bis + w
u − c˜) +
∫
iεLe
(bis + w
e − c˜) +
∫
j
Πj
]
= auxAjL
u
x,s
where Πj are the profits from the specialist input firms which are distributed firm own-
ers.12
3.5 On-The-Job Training
In this section we assume that on-the-job training is also a possible route to accumulating
human capital in the intermediate goods sector. We assume that the nature of work is
such that some employers can ensure the diligence of an employee by monitoring at an
additional cost of C. For ease of comparison we assume that the cost of training and
success probability of trained workers and their productivity is the same as for skilled
workers, although this is not necessary for the analysis.13 If C is sufficiently small then
there will be enough surplus for both the firm and the worker to gain from the on the
job training of any agent without the wealth to pay for their own skill accumulation.
We assume that the surplus is shared between the firm and the worker according to a
bargaining mechanism.
We apply the alternative offers bargaining mechanism, following Christiano, Eichen-
baum and Trabant (2016), and assume that in each period a number of matches between
a worker and a firm are made. In each match a firm and worker bargain with each other
over the wage in M subperiods. M can be any even number but for ease of exposition
we will assume M to be 4.14 In the odd periods the firm proposes a wage to the worker
and if rejected the worker makes a counter offer in the subsequent even period. In the
final sub-period, in our case period 4, the worker makes the firm a final take it or leave
it offer. This final sub-period closes the model which can then be solved by backward
induction. After each sub-period, there is an exogenously given chance that the match is
broken and that both the firm and the worker have to fall back to their outside option.
12We assume these are a very small number of firm owners and ignore their impact on income distribution
dynamics.
13The level of skills and cost of training could be different in the intermediate goods sector. What is
needed for the analysis is that return to labor from this type of training is below that of borrowing
to become skilled in period 1. i.e. we want to rule out wealthy agents taking this route to becoming
skilled which is counter factual.
14M can be generalized to any positive even integer (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2016)).
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We assume that there are measure JM firms with the capability of offering on the
job training in the intermediate goods sector. Each firm, k, must pay a fixed cost Φ˜k in
the previous period to enter the sector. Paying the fixed cost allows a firm to meet with
one worker with probability one. The firm and worker then bargain with each other over
the wage. A firm and worker combination i together can produce xi (= atx = w
h
t > a
u
x)
units of the intermediate good. The value to the firm of agreeing a wage with a worker in
period s and training her/him on the job is denoted by Js, and is given by the following
expression
Js = p
x
sa
t
x − w
T − eR− C
where wT is the wage of the trained worker, eR is the cost of training and C is the cost
of monitoring.
Firms borrow this fixed cost under limited liability from the financial market at
rate R˜ = R
πH
as the loan is only repaid in the event that training is successful. The
firm’s liabilities in the following period are Φk ≡ Φ˜kR˜. We assume that this fixed cost
liability, Φk, is distributed in the range [Φ,Φ]. Otherwise the firms are identical and
operate under free entry and behave competitively.
In equilibrium, there are two possibilities, either the intermediate goods firms em-
ploying unskilled workers are operative or they are not. If they do operate then the
price of intermediate goods, pxs , is given by the price that unskilled workers can supply
it pxs =
wus
aux
and for the marginal firm, k, that offers training Js = Φk. Alternatively, if
the entire demand for intermediate goods is satisfied by the training firms then pxs will
be the highest price that satisfies the total demand for intermediate goods as well as the
constraints that pxs ≤
wus
aux
and that Js ≥ Φ.
The value of a match and successful training and employment to a worker is wT
while the value to the worker of not agreeing with the firm, being unsuccessful at training
or not finding a match is being an unskilled worker, earning wage wU . As shown in the
Appendix this leads to a division of the surplus from the match described by the following
equation
wT = κwU + ξ(pi,sa
t
x − eR− C)
where
κ = τ [1 + (1− τ)2]; ξ = (1− τ)[τ + (1− τ)2]
Note that when τ = 0 then wT = pxsa
t
x − eR − C and if τ = 1 then w
T = wu For
intermediate values of τ the surplus of the match is split between the firm and the
12
worker.15 Thus by varying τ - a measure of the bargaining power of labor - all possible
divisions of the surplus between the firm and the worker are possible.
3.6 Skilled Immigration and On-The-Job Training
The effect of skilled immigration on the economy will differ depend on the wealth of the
immigrant and the sector they work in. We first analyze the direct effect of a skilled
immigrant working in the on-the-job training sector, before proceeding to discuss the
cases where skilled immigrants work in the traded sector, or act as entrepreneurs.
To analyze the case in the non-traded sector where firms may be matched with
less expensive or easier to train migrants we modify the set up above by assuming that
each firm, k, paying the fixed cost Φ˜k to enter the sector has a probability π
m of being
matched with a migrant. We assume that the migrant’s outside option in the event of
a breakdown in bargaining, wm, is lower than that of domestic workers, i.e. wm < wU
and also that the firm has the possibility of meeting another migrant worker in between
subperiods 2 and 3 of the bargaining process.16 As is intuitive, this has the effect of
reducing the equilibrium share of the match’s surplus given to trained workers.
If a firm is matched initially with an indigenous worker then the only change to
the bargaining process from above is between subperiods 2 and 3. The counter offer,
wT2 by the worker to the firm must take into account that the firm has the possibility
of meeting another migrant worker if it rejects the counter offer, wT2 . It is shown in the
Appendix that this leads to a division of the surplus from the match described by the
following equation
wT = κuwu + κmwm + ξ(pi,sa
t
x − eR− C)
where
κu = τ(1 + (1− τ)2); κm = (1− τ)τ 2πm; ξ = (1− τ)[τ + (1− τ)2 − τ
2
πm)]
Thus as before when τ = 0 then wT1 = p
x
sa
t
x − [eR − C] and so w
T extracts the
entire surplus of the match. If τ = 1 then wT = wu i.e. the firm extracts all the surplus
from the match. For intermediate values of τ the surplus of the match is split between
the firm and the worker, with πm having a negative effect on the training wage. The
possibility of employing migrants therefore increases a firm’s profits and reduces the wage
of an indigenous worker even if an immigrant is not hired in equilibrium.
15See Appendix for the derivation of the sharing rule.
16We regard wm as the wage in the source economy.
13
bi
s
bi
s+1
e
b̂
45◦
b̂ e
bi
s+1
δ(wH − c˜−R⋆(e− b̂))
δ(wT − c˜)
bi
s+1
δ(wU − c˜)
bi
s+1 b
i
s+1
b¯
πU
πD
Figure 2: Income distribution dynamics with on-the-job training.
Other cases will follow a similar logic. If a migrant worker is already trained (or
has smaller training costs) then the structure of the wage bargain doesn’t change but
the expected surplus from the match will increase. In this case therefore while the profit
of the firm will certainly rise from the possibility of hiring migrants, the equilibrium
wage may rise or fall depending on the level of τ . Thus the effect on wages is an
empirical matter. For evidence on this see Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012)
and Dustman and Frattini and Preston (2013).
In terms of the effects on the provision of training for indigenous workers, as skilled
immigration raises the profitability of firms engaged in on-the-job training, then more
firms should enter this sector of the economy. Whether the net effect of skilled immigrants
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on training places for indigenous workers is positive or negative depends on the strength
of this entry effect relative to the direct immigration effect. In equilibrium, because of
free entry, it must be the case that the marginal firm, k, makes zero expected profits.
The number of entering firms is determined by the slope of the fixed cost distribution
function at the equilibrium point. The flatter the distribution, the more firms enter
and so for a given migration probability the number of training opportunities for native
workers rises. Therefore immigration may cause the number of training places for native
to rise or fall. This is ultimately therefore an empirical matter which we address in
Section 5 below.
The effects of skilled migrants working in the traded sector are straightforward.
These immigrants will increase the demand for the non-traded good and so will have a
non-negative effect on the number of training places available to native workers. Similarly
skilled migrants who work as entrepreneurs setting up new firms that train native workers
will also have a non-negative effect on the number of training places available for native
workers. If skilled workers do not utilize their skills and work as unskilled workers, this
should also increase the demand for the non-traded good and so will have a non-negative
effect on the number of training places available to native workers.17
4 Social Mobility
In this section we describe the implications of on-the-job training and of skilled immigra-
tion for social mobility. In section 4.1 we first describe the dynamics and social mobility
of the economy without immigration before analyzing the case with immigration in sec-
tion 4.2. To ensure a non-degenerate income distribution we assume that skilled wages
are high enough to ensure that someone who receives income from a skilled wage and
a bequest of b̂ will themselves leave a bequest of b̂ or more as well as a corresponding
assumption about unskilled wages. This implies the following conditions for wus and w
H
s ,
wU < c˜+
b̂
δ
− Rb̂
wH > c˜+
b̂
δ
where δ = (1− α− β)
17It follows that unskilled immigration will have the same effect.
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Figure 3: Channels through which migration may affect social mobility.
16
4.1 Income Distribution Dynamics Without Immigration
The agents’ optimal human capital decisions together with their demand functions im-
plies that equation (1), below, describing the intergenerational dynamics, has three sec-
tions. Those with wealth (bequests) above e will find it optimal to invest in skills and
will become skilled workers with probability πh. For those with wealth (bequests) below
b̂, those who can obtain on the job training will receive the training wage while the rest
become unskilled workers. Those with wealth (bequests) greater then b̂ but less than e
will use their bequest and borrow the remainder to become skilled with probability πh.
bis+1 =

for bis > e
{
δ[wHs+1 − c˜+R((b
i
s)− e)] if training successful
δ[wus+1 − c˜+R((b
i
s)− e)] if training unsuccessful
for b̂ < bis < e
{
δ[wHs+1 − c˜−R
⋆(e− bis)] if training successful
0 if training unsuccessful
for bis < b̂
{
δ[wts+1 − c˜+Rb
i
s)] if training successful
δ[wus+1 − c˜+Rb
i
s] if training unsuccessful
(1)
The dynamics described by equation (1) are depicted in Figure 2. The income
distributional dynamics have both a force for upward mobility as well as downward
mobility. Downward mobility, depicted by the arrow labelled πD in Figure 2, is when
a wealthy agent does not succeed in becoming skilled and so only earns an unskilled
wage and suffers a reduction in wealth of e. Upward mobility, depicted by the arrow
labelled πU in Figure 2, is when low wealth agents succeed in accumulating enough wealth
for their offspring to purchase education in the following period. Clearly this potential
depends on workers trained via on the job training obtaining significantly higher wages
than unskilled workers.
A large range for wT is possible in this model, as described in section 3.6. Figure 2
depicts the case where wT is high enough so that trained workers’ bequests will be above
b̂ and thus their offspring will have as great a chance as anyone of becoming skilled the
following period. This is the most optimistic case for upward social mobility. Clearly a
wT lower than this will reduce the prospects for upward social mobility.
4.2 The Effects of Skilled Immigration
We analyse the case of skilled immigration on social mobility with reference to Figure 3,
which depicts three of the possible paths through which skilled immigration may affect
17
social mobility in this economy; (i) the effect of skilled immigrants working in the traded
sector (ii) the effect of skilled immigrants working in the job training sector and (iii)
the effects of skilled immigrants working as unskilled workers. We discuss these cases in
turn.
4.2.1 Skilled Migrants in the Traded Sector
Skilled immigrants in the traded sector will increase GDP per capita in the economy.
This case is depicted by the arrow in the top right section of Figure 3. Such immigrants
will increase the demand for non-traded goods and thus the number of agents working in
the non-traded sector must rise. This will have no effect on the number of trained workers
if all potential on-the-job training firms are active and unskilled workers are employed in
the intermediate goods sector. However if there are potential on-the-job training firms
that are not previously producing then this increase in demand may lead some to enter
the market, raising the overall amount of training places. This would therefore raise
the probability for upward social mobility, πU . The probability for downward mobility,
(1 − πh), will not be affected but the proportion of trained workers in the economy in
the long run will increase if the probability of obtaining on-the-job training increases.
4.2.2 Skilled Migrants in the Non-Traded Sector
As discussed in Section 3 skilled immigration into the on-the-job training sector will
increase the profitability of this sector by saving on training costs and so should cause
new firms to enter this sector. Whether this increases or decreases the probability of an
indigenous worker obtaining training depends on whether then increase in training places
created by new firms entering the market outweighs the loss of training places taken by
the migrants. This case is depicted by the arrow in the top left section of Figure 3. In
addition to this there is also the effect that skilled migration in the on-the-job training
sector has on the equilibrium trained wage, wT . As described in Section 3, this also may
fall or rise depending on the reservation wage of the migrants, wm, and the increase in
the surplus of a match due to reduced training costs. The lower is wT the lower the
possibility for upward social mobility for the next generation due to lower bequests. A
sufficiently low level of wT would eliminate upward social mobility entirely.
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4.2.3 Skilled Migrants Working in Unskilled Jobs
Many skilled immigrants in the UK work in unskilled jobs, see Wadsworth (2018). This
case is depicted by the arrow in the lower left section of Figure 3. Within the period this
will increase the demand for non-traded goods and this will have a non-negative effect
on the training opportunities for native workers as described in section 4.2.1. However
the offspring of these migrants may have a chance of taking a training place the following
period and so may reduce the dynastic prospects for upward social mobility for native
workers. If this type of migration is permanent then this may increase the proportion of
unskilled agents in the economy and reduce measured aggregate productivity.
4.2.4 High Wealth Immigrants and Skilled Migrants as Entrepreneurs
Any migrants that work as entrepreneurs and who increase the number of firms offering
on the job training will clearly increase social mobility. Similarly any immigrant with high
wealth will increase the demand for non-traded goods and so will have a non-negative
effect on the training opportunities for native workers as described in section 4.2.1. The
contrast between these two effects is that the effect of the high wealth immigrant will
be temporary as the wealth of the dynasty will tend to that of the average high skill
worker over time. Whereas if the entrepreneur permanently increases the probability of
obtaining on the job training then the proportion of high skilled workers in the economy,
and so aggregate productivity in the long run will increase.
5 Empirical Evidence
In order to test the implications of the model above we need data on both the incidence
of training and hiring, the age, education and country of origin of those trained and
the share of skilled immigrants working in each sector. All these pieces of information
are contained in the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a quarterly random
sample of around 50,000 households and the individuals therein. Since 1995 there has
been a question on whether an employed individual has received any work or college
based training in the past 3 months.18 We define a new hire as anyone in a job for less
18The training variable used is the response to the LFS question “In the 3 months since [date] have you
taken part in any education or any training connected with your job or a job that you might be able
to do in the future? ”The question is only asked to those in employment under the age of 70 and not
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than twelve months. The LFS also contains details of the country of birth. This allows
us to split the sample into UK-born and Immigrants. The LFS also contains information
on year of arrival and age leaving full time education. From this we can define a skilled
adult immigrant as someone who left full-time education after the age of 18 (i.e. with
some level of tertiary education) and who arrived in the UK after the age of 22, (i.e.
with some degree of work experience abroad).
The training and hiring data of individuals are then averaged to a sectoral level. A
sector in our analysis is a combination of one digit occupation and two digit industry.19
The occupational sector definitions change significantly in 2001, which makes matching
before this period difficult. We therefore begin our sample period from this point.20
We pool across all quarters in each year. This ensures that there is a minimum of 100
observations in each sector in each year with a median cell size of 2226. This generates
a balanced panel of 158 sectors over 18 years. The model above makes a distinction
between good and bad jobs, and between traded and non-traded jobs. We define the
traded sector as all occupations in industries Agricultural Production 01 to Miscellaneous
Manufacturing 39.21 A good job sector is defined as a sector with a mean wage higher
than the aggregate mean wage over the sample period.
The estimated model has the following form
OJTit = β0 + β1Immigrantit−1 + γZit + si + sit + ǫit (2)
where OJTit is the share of all UK born workers in sector i at time t, in receipt of on
the job training,
OJTNit
Nit
. Since the model can also be interpreted as a willingness to take
on local-born workers we also estimate the incidence of hiring, replacing the dependent
variable in equation (2) with the sector share of all UK-born hires at time t, defined as
HNit
HNt
.
Immigrantit−1 is the share of skilled adult immigrants working in sector i at time t− 1,
and β1 is the parameter of interest. Z are a set of controls associated with training and
to working students. See
http : //doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7985/mrdoc/pdf/lfsuserguidevol2questionnaire2016.pdf
This variable was used by Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2006) and shown by them to be positively
associated with higher productivity.
19For example sector 322 is an associate professional(1-digit SOC code = 3) working in the health
industry(2-digit SIC code = 22).
20The industry classifications also change in 2009 but we correct for this using the mapping of Smith
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/jcsmith/sicmapping/
21We have investigated the sensitivity of our results to different definitions of the traded sector and the
results, available on request, are generally little changed.
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hiring. The controls include the sector mean proportions of women, graduates, part-time
working, self-employment, temporary working, large firm size, public sector, along with
sector mean age, job tenure and hourly wages. There is also a control for the percentage
change in sector size to try to account for the differential effect of growth sectors. The
sit are sector fixed effects and sector trends. The immigrant variable is lagged to reduce
contemporaneous endogeneity concerns. This does not however exclude the possibility
of a violation of strict exogeneity that would compromise the estimation. Since the
bias in fixed effects estimation of equation (2) if strict exogeneity is violated is O( 1
T
),
we proceed with the estimation under this caveat, although we do explore alternative
estimation procedures in the robustness checks which follow. The variance of the error
term may contain a group (sector) specific component but could also be influenced by
possible unobserved spillovers across groups both spatially and over time. We therefore
estimate the model using HAC error robustness, that is, robust to heteroskedasticity of
unknown form and which also allows for unknown autocorrelation, (see Cameron and
Millar (2013)).22
5.1 Results
Table 3 outlines the estimates from a set of sectoral-level regressions of the share of
UK-born adults receiving training on the lagged employment share of immigrants who
arrived as adults with education after high school. The first column is an OLS regres-
sion giving the raw correlation between the variables. Column 2 gives the estimate of
the training effect of immigration net of sectoral controls alongside sector fixed effects.
Column 3 additionally includes sector trends. This is arguably a more stringent test
of the effect of immigration and is our preferred specification. Since some sectors are
larger than others we also weight the observations by sector sample population. These
estimates are given in Column (4). Panel A estimates the average skilled immigration
effect across all sectors. This is insignificant in all specifications. Panel B allows the im-
migration effect to vary across the three broad sectors suggested by the model: traded,
non-traded (High Wage) and non-traded (Low Wage) sectors. The individual point es-
timates for the non-traded sectors are negative but insignificantly different from zero in
our preferred specification (Column 3). They are however significantly different from the
traded sector indicating that there may be a differential effect of immigration on training
22We also test the sensitivity of the estimated standard errors to different clustering assumptions.
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across the traded and non-traded sector as predicted by our theoretical model. However
the data do not indicate a significant difference between the effect of skilled immigra-
tion on training between the high and low wage non-traded sectors. The weighted least
squares estimates for the effect of skilled immigration on training in all three sectors are
statistically insignificant but are again suggestive of a larger negative effect of skilled
immigration in the non-traded good job sectors.
Since there may be concerns that the skilled immigration effect may be picking up
other aspects of immigration, Panel C additionally includes interactions of the sectors
with other immigrant groups. The estimates of the skilled immigration effect are broadly
the same as those for Panel B. While insignificant, the negative point estimates again
suggest that the skilled immigrant effect on training may be larger in the non-traded
sector than that of other immigrants. The weighted least squares estimates also point
to an additional effect of unskilled immigration on training in the non-traded low wage
sector. 23
Table 4 outlines the estimates from a set of regressions where the sector share of
all native born hires is now the dependent variable. Table 4 has the same format as
Table 3. The skilled immigrant effect on hiring of UK-born workers is more significant
than for training. While there is no overall skilled immigration effect on hiring (Panel
A) this obscures a significant negative effect in the high wage non-traded Sector (Panel
B Columns 3 and 4). The weighted estimates of this effect in column 4 are somewhat
larger but tell the same story. The skilled immigration effect on hiring holds when the
other immigrant share variable is included as a control (Panel C). The magnitude of the
effect is however not large. A 5 percentage point increase in the skilled immigrant sector
share, the average increase in the sample over the period, see Table 1, reduces the sector
share of native hiring by 0.02 percentage points. 24
In the Appendix we assess the robustness of the estimates to different measures of
immigrant concentration, standard errors and estimation techniques. Since there is little
23This result does not map straightforwardly to the model but would be consistent with an extended
model that allows for differential training effects between high wage and low wage non-traded sectors.
24The mean hiring share in this period is 0.006 thus the effect is a reduction of 0.004× 0.05/0.006 i.e.
about 3% or about 0.013 × 0.05/0.006 = 10.8% if using the weighted least squares point estimate.
5% is also approximately one standard deviation of the skilled immigrant workforce share in the high
wage non-traded sector As the dependent variable is the share of hiring this implies that on average
share of native hiring on other sectors must go up, i.e. native labor is being reallocated away from
the high wage non-traded sector.
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consensus in the literature regarding the appropriate measure of immigrant concentra-
tion, Tables A1 and A2 display the results from estimates of the model using different
measures of immigrant concentration. In column 2 we use the immigrant ratio M
N
, used
as a measure of immigrant concentration in many studies, see e.g. Dustmann, Frattini
and Preston (2013). In column 3 we use the fixed ratio M
N0
where N0 is the sector count
of native workers in the initial period, the year 2000. The latter means that the changes
are identified off the absolute change in immigration numbers rather than the relative
change. These estimates are generally insignificantly different from each other and con-
tinue to suggest a similar small negative association between skilled immigration and
native hiring shares.
Table A3 tests the sensitivity of the standard error estimates to different assump-
tions about heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation. Again the standard error esti-
mates are very similar and do not change the overall conclusions regarding significance
or otherwise. Table A4 presents estimates of the skilled immigrant effect using different
estimation techniques. Column 1 estimates the model in first differences rather than
within groups. The estimates are generally less precise than for the fixed effects model
but of similar sign and magnitude. Column 2 adds a lagged dependent variable to the
model estimated with fixed effects. Fixed effect estimation of lagged dependent vari-
able models are of course inconsistent, with the bias again being of order O( 1
T
). One
potential solution is to instrument the lag and all other strictly endogenous variables
with values lagged t − 2 and beyond and estimate the model in first differences. The
data however precludes this approach since we have autocorrelation in the differenced
residuals going back at least 10 periods. For completeness we nevertheless present first
difference estimates using 5 period lags as instrumental variables in column 3. Column
4 estimates the fixed effects model using instruments from outside the system, namely
the standard Bartik shift-share instrument. These instruments perform poorly in the
presence of sector trends.
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6 Conclusion
Despite a strong decline in aggregate training rates in the UK over the last twenty years
and a strong increase in skilled immigration, this paper has found only small skilled
immigration effects on the training of natives across traded and non-traded sectors and
no significant evidence of different training effects between the high wage and low wage
non-traded sector. The negative effect of skilled immigration on the hiring of natives
in ‘good job’ sectors that we do find is also small and therefore is not likely to be a
major driver of social mobility. This paper has demonstrated theoretically that skilled
immigration may have both negative and positive effects on native training and hiring.
These may have broadly offset each other in the empirical estimation.
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Table 3: Training
1 2 3 4
Panel A
Skilled Immigrants -0.065 0.039 -0.034 -0.030
(0.075) (0.037) (0.041) (0.033)
Panel B
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.147 0.114∗ -0.068 -0.004
(0.091) (0.050) (0.058) (0.049)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant -0.058 0.172∗ 0.089 0.006
(0.086) (0.057) (0.080) (0.064)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.009 -0.199 -0.113 -0.066
(0.102) (0.053) (0.063) (0.047)
Panel C
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.153 0.019 -0.078 -0.011
(0.103) (0.055) (0.060) (0.049)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant 0.173 0.072 0.090 0.004
(0.111) (0.070) (0.078) (0.065)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.231 -0.293 -0.113 -0.067
(0.121) (0.056) (0.063) (0.047)
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Other Immigrant -0.177 0.012 -0.070 −0.109∗
(0.051) (0.040) (0.048) (0.040)
Traded×Other Immigrant -0.388 0.046 0.039 0.007
(0.059) (0.061) (0.064) (0.051)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Other Immigrant 0.267 -0.049 -0.029 -0.024
(0.106) (0.077) (0.063) (0.0051)
Controls
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector No Yes Yes Yes
Sector Trends No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample Size 2686, * significant at 5% level. HAC robust panel standard errors in brackets.
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Table 4: Hiring
1 2 3 4
Panel A
Skilled Immigrants 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Panel B
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skiiled Immigrant 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.016∗
(0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant -0.015 −0.008∗ 0.001 -0.002
(0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.013 0.014∗ −0.004∗ −0.012∗
(0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Panel C
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.042 0.001 0.002 0.015∗
(0.019) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant -0,007 −0.007∗ -0.001 -0.002
(0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.015 0.012∗ −0.004∗ −0.013∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Other Immigrant 0.035 -0.009 -0.001 -0.004
(0.017) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Traded×Other Immigrant -0.002 -0.006 −0.002∗ −0.009∗
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Other Immigrant 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Controls
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector No Yes Yes Yes
Sector Trends No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample Size 2686, * significant at 5% level. HAC robust panel standard errors in brackets.
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Appendix
Table A1: Training - Alternative Immigration Definitions
Share(M/(N+M)) Ratio (M/N) Fixed Ratio (M/N0)
Panel A
Skilled Immigrants -0.034 - 0.028 -0.003
(0.041) (0.028) (0.021)
Panel B
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.068 -0.052 -0.006
(0.058) (0.040) (0.042)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant 0.089 0.055 0.078
(0.080) (0.052) (0.063)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.113 -0.079 -0.016
(0.063) (0.047) (0.021)
Panel C
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.078 -0.040 -0.010
(0.059) (0.039) (0.044)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant 0.090 0.052 0.068
(0.078) (0.055) (0.074)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.113 -0.074 -0.024
(0.063) (0.045) (0.022)
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Other Immigrant -0.070 -0.049 -0.027
(0.048) (0.033) (0.023)
Traded×Other Immigrant 0.039 0.019 0.026
(0.063) (0.046) (0.066)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Other Immigrant -0.029 -0.049 0.015
(0.063) (0.033) (0.024)
Controls
Year Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
Sector Trends Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Sample Size 2686, * significant at 5% level. HAC robust panel standard errors in brackets.
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Table A2: Hiring - Alternative Immigration Definitions
Share(M/(N+M)) Ratio (M/N) Fixed Ratio (M/N0)
Panel A
Skilled Immigrants -0.001 - 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.002 0.012∗ 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant −0.004∗ −0.004∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel C
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.002 0.002∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant −0.004∗ −0.004∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Other Immigrant -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Traded×Other Immigrant −0.002∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Other Immigrant −0.002∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls
Year Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
Sector Trends Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Sample Size 2686, * significant at 5% level. HAC robust panel standard errors in brackets.
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Table A3: Standard Error Robustness Check
HAC Parsen HAC Cluster: Cluster:
(Table 3) Kernel (Bandwidth 2) Sector Sector Year
Training
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.078 -0.078 -0.078 -0.078 -0.078
(0.060) (0.061) (0.063) (0.057) (0.083)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
(0.078) (0.077) (0.075) 0.080 0.077
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.113 -0.113 -0.113 -0.113 -0.113
(0.063) (0.062) (0.059) (0.067) (0.074)
Hiring
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant −0.0042∗ −0.0042∗ −0.0042∗ −0.0042∗ −0.0042∗
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Notes: Sample Size 2686, * significant at 5% level. Controls as in Column 3 Table 3. The default kernel in column 1 is Bartlett. Bandwidth
2 with a Bartlett Kernel implies autocorrelation of order 1 is allowed for.
Table A4: Estimation Robustness Checks
First Diff LDV First Diff Within Group
IV IV
Training
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.014 -0.065 -0.152 -0.338
(0.067) (0.061) (0.174) (0.493)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant 0.180 0.063 0.050 -0.665
(0.085) (0.026) (0.208) (1.014)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.023 -0.097 -0.121 0.763
(0.069) (0.065) (0.176) (1.129)
Hiring
Non-Traded(Low Wage)×Skilled Immigrant 0.0026 0.0038 0.0029 0.0239
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0037) (0.0221)
Traded×Skilled Immigrant 0.0014 0.0010 0.0037 -0.0128
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0292)
Non-Traded(High Wage)×Skilled Immigrant -0.0012 -0.0027 0.0059 0.0286
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0289)
Notes: Sample Size 2686, * significant at 5% level. Controls as in Column 3 Table 3
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Derivation of Wages Under Bargaining
The Case Without Migration
The offered wage to the worker in the first sub-period of bargaining, wT1 , satisfies .
wT1 = τw
u + (1− τ)wT2
where wT2 is the wage that the worker would offer in their counter offer to the firm. w
T
2
must satisfy
pxsa
t
x − w
T
2 − eR − C ≥ τ0 + (1− τ)[p
x
sa
t
x − w
T
3 − eR − C]
where wT3 is the further counter offer by the firm and where τ is the exogenous chance
that the match breaks down. Similarly wT3 must satisfy
wT3 = τw
u + (1− τ)wT4
Since subperiod 4 is the final sub period then wT4 will simply be set to the maximum
level that the firm will accept so that
wT4 = p
x
sa
t
x − eR− C
These equations can be solved by iterated substitution (backward induction) into the
expression for wT1 to give
wT1 =τ [1 + (1− τ)
2]wu+(1− τ)[τ + (1− τ)2](p
x
sa
t
x−eR− C)
This gives us the expression for wT in the text
wT = κwu + ξ(pi,sa
t
x − eR− C)
The Case With Skilled Immigration
If a firm is matched initially with an indigenous worker then the offered wage in the first
sub-period of bargaining, wt1, satisfies the same expression as before
wT1 = τw
u + (1− τ)wT2
But now wT2 must take into account that the firm has the possibility of meeting a migrant
worker if it rejects the counter offer. Thus wT2 must satisfy
pxsa
t
x−w
T
2 −eR−C ≥ τ(1−π
m)0+τπm[pxsa
t
x−w
T,m
3 −eR−C]+(1−τ)[p
x
s a
t
x−w
T
3−eR − C]
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where τπmis the exogenous chance that the match breaks down and the firm is matched
with a migrant worker.
The firm will choose the offer, wT3 or w
T,m
3 so that the relevant worker is indifferent
between accepting and making a final take it or leave it counter offer wt4 (which will be
the same for both types of workers) so that
wT3 = τw
u + (1− τ)wt4; w
T,m
3 = τw
m + (1− τ)wt4;
It follows that wT3 > w
T,m
3 since w
u > wm
Given this the equations can be solved by iterated substitution as before so that
wT1 =τ(1 + (1− τ)
2)wu+(1− τ)τ 2πmwm+(1− τ)[τ + (1− τ)2 − τ
2
πm)](pxsa
t
x − eR− C)
Thus we can write the equation for wt in the text
wT = κuwu + κmwm + ξ(pi,sa
t
x − eR− C)
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